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Termination of Parental Rights: Putting Love in Its Place
Parentage is a very important profession; but no test offitness for it
is ever imposed in the interest of the children.
- George Bernard Shawi
Shaw may have been an uncommonly perceptive social critic, but in this
case he was only half right. Although men and women generally are not told
whether they are fit to have children, courts often decide whether they are fit to
keep them.2 Statutes in almost every state permit courts to terminate the paren-
tal rights of individuals who abandon, abuse, or otherwise neglect their chil-
dren.3 North Carolina district courts4 may "completely and permanently' 5
sever the parent-child relationship in such cases, 6 unless the judge specifically
finds that termination of parental rights would not be in "the best interests of the
1. G. SAW, EvERYBoDY's POLrICAL WHAT's WHAT 74 (1944).
2. Removal of children from a dangerous environment is justified by the doctrine ofparens
patriae (literally, parent of the country). Parenspatriae "traces back to the English Court of Chan-
cery's recognition that the throne had a duty to protect every subject incapable of protecting himself,
including children." Note, Termination of Parental Rights: The Substantive Due Process Issue, 26
ST. Louis U.L.J. 915, 917 (1982) (citing Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 664 (Ch. 1722)); see
also Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REv. 205 (1971)
(history of the parens patriae doctrine).
Shaw knew that courts sometimes take children away from their parents, but attributed the
practice to something other than pure benevolence: "In certain rare cases like those of the poet
Shelley and Annie Besant the State may take the children out of their parents' hands and make them
wards in Chancery lest they should be brought up as atheists." G. SHAw, supra note 1, at 74.
3. See Bell, Termination of Parental Rights: Recent Judicial and Legislative Trends, 30 EM-
oRY L.J. 1065, 1067 (1981).
4. "The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine any
petition relating to termination of parental rights .... " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.23 (Cum.
Supp. 1983). The district courts'jurisdiction, however, is not in fact exclusive. Superior court clerks
may terminate parental rights during an adoption proceeding if the child has been abandoned. See
id. § 48-5 (1984). The North Carolina General Statutes Commission has proposed legislation that
would end this practice and give genuinely exclusive jurisdiction over termination cases to the dis-
trict courts. Letter from Floyd M. Lewis, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable Abner
Alexander, Chief District Court Judge, 21st Judicial District (Jan. 11, 1985) (available at Institute of
Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.33 (Cui. Supp. 1983). "Following an order of termination,
the parent has no right to contact the child or to be notified of the child's location, welfare, or
adoption by a third party." Bell, supra note 3, at 1068. Courts frequently have remarked on the
severity of this action. See, eg., Davis v. Page, 618 F.2d 374, 379 (1980) ("[I]t is not unlikely that
many parents would choose to serve a prison sentence rather than to lose the companionship and
custody of their children."), aff'd in part, vacated and rev'd in part on reh'g, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir.
1981) (en banc); In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 370, 383 A.2d 1228, 1252 (Manderino, J., dissenting)
(" T]he child is dead so far as that parent is concerned."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978); In re
Gibson, 4 Wash. App. 372, 379, 483 P.2d 131, 135 (1971) (Termination cuts off rights "more pre-
cious to many people than the right to life itself.").
Neglected children may be-and usually are-temporarily removed from their parents' homes
before termination proceedings are initiated. During this period the children may be returned to the
parents if the situation improves. See infra text accompanying notes 35-39.
6. Grounds for termination in North Carolina are set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32
(1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983), which states in part:
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child."'7 Unfortunately, there may be considerable disagreement about what
constitutes neglect, 8 or what is in a child's best interests. 9 A recent North Caro-
lina Supreme Court decision, In re Montgomery,'0 illustrates the difficulties in-
herent in using such ill- defined standards to justify breaking up a family.
David Maxwell and Geraldine Montgomery were the parents of four minor
children.1' The couple was not married, 12 and both individuals were mentally
retarded.13 Maxwell earned about $120 a week as a welder and handyman on a
farm in Harnett County, North Carolina. 14 The family's small house "was
sparsely furnished, having a single bed on which the parents slept and a mattress
on the floor on which the four children slept."' 5 In September 1980 the children
were adjudged neglected 16 and temporary custody was awarded to the Harnett
County Department of Social Services. 17 Maxwell later was ordered to pay
thirty dollars a week for the support of his children while they were in foster
The court may terminate the parental rights upon a finding of one or more of the
following:
(2) The parent has abused or neglected the child....
(4) The child has been placed in the custody of a county department of social services,
a licensed child-placing agency, or a child-caring institution, and the parent, for a continu-
ous period of six months next preceding the filing of the petition, has failed to pay a reason-
able portion of the cost of care for the child.
(7) That the parent is incapable as a result of mental retardation, mental illness, or-
ganic brain syndrome, or any other degenerative mental condition of providing for the
proper care and supervision of the child.. . and that there is a reasonable probability that
such incapability will continue throughout the minority of the child.
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.31(a) (1981); cf. id. § 7A-289.22(3) (1981) ("Action which is in
the best interests of the child should be taken in all cases where the interests of the child and those of
his parents or other persons are in conflict.").
8. See infra note 67. In North Carolina a child "who does not receive proper care, supervi-
sion, or discipline from his parent" is said to be neglected. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(21) (1981).
The full text of this minimally helpful definition is reproduced infra at note 23.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 51-55 and 95-99.
10. 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984).
11. Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 102, 316 S.E.2d at 248. The children, three girls and a boy,
ranged in age from five to ten at the time of the termination hearing. Id. at 101-02, 316 S.E.2d at
246-48.
12. Id. at 103, 316 S.E.2d at 248. Maxwell testified that he and Montgomery had considered
marriage but felt that they got along better without it. See Transcript of Termination Hearing at 15.
The couple still lives together and they remain unmarried. Telephone interview with 0. Henry
Willis, attorney for Maxwell and Montgomery (Jan. 24, 1985).
13. Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 103, 316 S.E.2d at 248. Maxwell scored 54 on the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Test, which places him in the moderately retarded category. Montgomery scored
55, which is considered mildly retarded. Petition for Termination of Parental Rights at 4 (D. Mont-
gomery). In addition to being retarded, Montgomery frequently insisted that "someone was looking
in the windows of her house and also that someone was trying to get inside her mind. She continu-
ously claimed, for a period of about 14 months, that she was pregnant, when in fact she had had a
hysterectomy." Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 103, 316 S.E.2d at 248.
14. Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 103, 316 S.E.2d at 248.
15. Id. Other evidence of neglect included the older children's poor school attendance record
and a lack of food in the house. Id. at 103, 316 S.E.2d at 248-49.
16. Neglect proceedings typically precede-and are distinct from-actions for termination of
parental rights. See infra text accompanying notes 35-40.
17. Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 104, 316 S.E.2d at 249.
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care, but during the next forty-five weeks only three payments were made.18
The county Department of Social Services filed a petition for termination of
parental rights, and the district court entered an order against Maxwell and
Montgomery in January 1982,19 "citing as grounds neglect by the mother and
both neglect and a failure to pay a reasonable [portion of the] cost of care by the
father." 20
The North Carolina Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's termina-
tion order.2 1 A three-judge panel22 in In re Montgomery held that the statutory
definition of child neglect 2 3 "is sufficiently broad to allow interpretation by the
courts and the engrafting of some requirement that due consideration be given to
non-economic or non-physical indicia.' '2 4 Therefore, the court concluded that
before terminating parental rights because of neglect, trial courts must "deter-
mine whether love, affection, and the other intangible qualities to be found in a
family relationship actually exist .... *25 The district court had made no such
findings, and consequently its decision in Montgomery was vacated.
26
The North Carolina Supreme Court unanimously reversed the court of ap-
peals and substantially reinstated the judgment of the trial court.27 In a wide-
ranging opinion by Justice Copeland, the supreme court held that "the Termina-
tion of Parental Rights statute as drafted provides an appropriate forum to ad-
dress the 'intangible needs' issue, as well as protects a parent's interest in
preserving the family."' 28 Thus, it concluded that the court of appeals' require-
ment of "a separate and distinct finding regarding the adequate fulfillment of a
18. Id. Maxwell attributed his nonpayment to a failed hog farming venture. Transcript of
Termination Hearing at 18.
19. See Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 104, 316 S.E.2d at 249.
20. Id. at 102, 316 S.E.2d at 248; see also supra note 6 (grounds for terminating parental rights).
The trial court held N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32(7) (1981), which permits termination based on a
parent's mental incapacity, to be unconstitutional. See Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 116, 316 S.E.2d at
256. This decision later was reversed by the North Carolina Supreme Court. See infra note 29.
21. In re Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. 343, 303 S.E.2d 324 (1983), rev'd, 311 N.C. 101, 316
S.E.2d 246 (1984).
22. The panel included Judge Hill, who wrote the opinion, and Judges Johnson and Phillips.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(21) (1981) defines a neglected juvenile as an individual
who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from his parent, guardian,
custodian, or caretaker; or who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary
medical care or other remedial care recognized under State law, or who lives in an environ-
ment injurious to his welfare, or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of
law.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(21) was held constitutional in In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 293 S.E.2d
127 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983).
24. In re Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. 343, 349, 303 S.E.2d 324, 327 (1983), rev'd, 311 N.C. 101,
316 S.E.2d 246 (1984).
25. Id. at 353, 303 S.E.2d at 330. The court of appeals also held that the trial judge's findings
of fact did not support his conclusion that Maxwell had failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost
of caring for his children while they were in the custody of the Department of Social Services. Id. at
354-55, 303 S.E.2d at 330. This portion of the court of appeals' opinion, in addition to the portion
discussed in the text of this Note, was reversed by the supreme court. See Montgomery, 311 N.C. at
113-14, 316 S.E.2d at 253-54; infra note 29.
26. Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. at 355, 303 S.E.2d at 330.
27. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984).
28. Id. at 108, 316 S.E.2d at 251.
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child's intangible and non-economic needs... is not justified."'29 This Note
first examines the supreme court's treatment of the intangible needs issue, and
then suggests three ways in which North Carolina's procedures for termination
of parental rights should be clarified to better protect the interests of both chil-
dren and their parents.
Child abuse and neglect are among the oldest and most intractable
problems facing our society.30 Nationwide, more than half a million children
are wards of the state. 31 As of September 1984, North Carolina county depart-
ments of social services had custody of 6853 children, most of whom had been
abused, abandoned, or neglected by their parents or guardians. 32 During fiscal
year 1983-84 there were 6642 confirmed cases of child abuse and neglect in
North Carolina; another 9901 cases were reported but not confirmed.
33
Although relatively few of these cases end up in juvenile court, and fewer still
lead to termination of parental rights,34 the magnitude of the problem is readily
apparent.
Given the severe consequences of an order terminating parental rights, 35
29. Id. Regarding Maxwell's failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of foster care for his
children, see supra note 25, the supreme court determined that,
A parent's ability to pay is the controlling characteristic of what is a 'reasonable portion' of
[the] cost of foster care.... A parent is required to pay that portion of the cost of foster
care. . . . that is fair, just, and equitable based upon the parent's ability or means to pay.
Id. at 113, 316 S.E.2d at 254 (quoting In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 603-04, 28 S.E.2d 47, 55 (1981).
The court stated further that "[w]e believe there was ample evidence from which the trial court
could conclude that respondent Maxwell failed to pay a reasonable portion of the costs of care of the
children." Id. at 114, 316 S.E.2d at 254.
Although the trial court had declared N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32(7) (1981)-which permits
termination of parental rights in cases of mental incapacity-to be unconstitutional, see supra note
20, the issue was not raised by either party in the court of appeals. See Montgomery, 311 N.C. at
114, 316 S.E.2d at 254. It was raised in the supreme court, however, and the judgment of the trial
court was reversed. Id. at 114-16, 316 S.E.2d at 254-56. The court held that termination of parental
rights for reasons of long-term mental incapacity does not violate either the due process or the equal
protection provisions of the fourteenth amendment. Id. The supreme court thus followed the exam-
ple of several other states. See, eg., In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 27 Ariz.
App. 420, 555 P.2d 679 (1976); In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1979); In re
J.C., 242 Ga. 737, 251 S.E.2d 299 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Crane v. Carroll County Dep't
of Family and Children Servs., 441 U.S. 929 (1979); People ex reL Nabstedt v. Barger, 3 Ill. 2d 511,
121 N.E.2d 781 (1954); In re Atkins, 112 Mich. App. 528, 316 N.W.2d 477 (1982); In re Sylvia M.,
82 A.D.2d 217, 443 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1981), aff'd, 57 N.Y.2d 636, 439 N.E.2d 870, 454 N.Y.S.2d 61
(1982); Department of Human Servs. v. Ogle, 617 S.W.2d 652 (Tenn. App. 1980).
30. See Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect Part P: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social
Perspectives, 50 N.C.L. REv. 293 (1972).
31. See Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423 (1983).
32. Memorandum from Sue Glasby, Head, Children's Services Branch, N.C. Division of Social
Services, to Permanent Families Task Force, Attachment A (Oct. 23, 1984) (available at Institute of
Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum]. Of
the 6853 children in Department of Social Services custody, 822 had been abused, 129 had been
abandoned, and 3413 had been neglected. Id.
33. Id. at Attachment D. These figures break down to 11,181 reports of neglect (4980 con-
firmed) and 5362 reports of abuse (1662 confirmed). Id. The major contributing factors in con-
firmed abuse and neglect reports were the parents' lack of child development knowledge, mental
retardation and emotional disturbance, and alcohol abuse. Id.
34. Interview with Janet Mason, Institute of Government, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill (Feb. 18, 1985). Exact figures are unavailable. See infra note 41 and accompanying
text.
35. See supra note 5.
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the State typically begins action against parents in juvenile cases by petitioning
for an adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency. 36 If the court finds the
complaint valid, it may award custody of the children involved to the State or to
some other foster care provider,37 subject to periodic review. 38 Although an
award of custody in these cases permits the reunification of parents and children
if conditions in the home improve,39 an initial judgment of neglect often results
in permanent separation. 4°
Because North Carolina only recently began keeping track of termination
petitions, 41 little is known about how often or how quickly the State cuts off
parental rights in cases of child abuse and neglect.42 Termination procedures
36. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-561(b) (1981); 4 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW
§ 292 (1979) (quoting H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL § 20.7 (1977)).
37. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-647(2) (1981).
38. See id. § 7A-657 (1981). "ITihejudge shall conduct a review within six months of the date
the order was entered, and shall conduct subsequent reviews at least every year thereafter." Id.
39. See id.
40. As of September 1984, only about one-third of the 6853 children in the custody of the
North Carolina Division of Social Services placement authority were expected to return home. See
Memorandum, supra note 32, at Attachment A.
41. Telephone interview with Virginia Weisz, Administrator, Guardian Ad Litem Program,
N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts (Jan. 24, 1985). Record-keeping began in the summer of
1984 and should be reflected in the Administrative Office of the Courts' next annual report. Id.
42. Cases reaching the appellate level indicate that in many instances termination of parental
rights is not only justifiable, but arguably overdue. See, e.g., In re Adcock, 69 N.C. App. 222, 316
S.E.2d 347 (1984) (child beaten; parents failed to provide adequate food and clothing); In re Pierce,
67 N.C. App. 257, 312 S.E.2d 900 (1984) (child born with fetal alcohol syndrome; mother convicted
of heroin possession and prostitution); In re Apa, 59 N.C. App. 322, 296 S.E.2d 811 (1982) (father's
only contribution to child's support in 11 years was gift of bicycle); In re Allen, 58 N.C. App. 322,
293 S.E.2d 607 (1982) (children frequently dirty, unfed, and urine soaked; parents failed to provide
medical care); In re Smith, 56 N.C. App. 142, 287 S.E.2d 440 (mother with tuberculosis refused to
arrange separate living quarters for infant and later abandoned children), cert. denied, 306 N.C. 385,
294 S.E.2d 212 (1982); In re Biggers, 50 N.C. App. 332, 274 S.E.2d 236 (1981) (mother had severe
drug and alcohol problems; home infested with pests due to debris and garbage). These extreme
examples of neglect and abuse make the evidence against the parents in Montgomery seem rather
weak by comparison. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
The hair-raising nature of so many published cases also seems to contribute to the failure of
most constitutionally based attacks on termination statutes. See generally Annot., 22 A.L.R.4th 774
(1983) (compilation of cases discussing constitutionality of state termination statutes). Courts fre-
quently have rejected claims that the provisions of termination statutes are impermissibly vague.
See, e-g., In re Ladewig, 34 Ill. App. 3d 393, 340 N.E.2d 150 (1975); In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 293
S.E.2d 127 (1982), appeal dismissed sub nom. Moore v. Guilford County Dep't of Social Servs., 459
U.S. 1139 (1983); In re J.Z., 190 N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1971); State v. McMaster, 259 Ore. 291, 486 P.2d
567 (1971); In re D.T., 89 S.D. 590, 237 N.W.2d 166 (1975); D-F- v. State, 525 S.W.2d 933
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975). Contra Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Alsager v. District
Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd in part per curiam, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976);
Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark. 112, 583 S.W.2d 37 (1979).
Some state courts have applied strict scrutiny when examining the constitutionality of termina-
tion statutes, see, e.g., In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 192-93, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63, 68-69 (1979),
although this does not appear to be the practice in North Carolina. See Montgomery, 311 N.C. at
115, 316 S.E.2d at 255 (statute merely required to have "rational relation" to state interests). The
United States Supreme Court has recognized "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in
the care, custody, and management of their child," Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982),
but has gone only so far as to say that "[w]hen the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds,
it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures." Id. at 753-54; see also Montgom-
ery, 311 N.C. at 106, 316 S.E.2d at 250 (asserting that Santosky holding confined to consideration of
procedural due process claims).
Courts often reject equal protection challenges to termination statutes. See In re Appeal in
Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 27 Ariz. App. 420, 555 P.2d 679 (1976); In re Adoption of Ah-
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begin when a qualified party,43 frequently a county department of social serv-
ices, files a petition in district court alleging one or more of the grounds set forth
in North Carolina General Statutes section 7A-289.32.44 A formal hearing is
conducted,4 5 at which the petitioner must prove by "clear, cogent, and convinc-
ing evidence" 46 that at least one of the alleged grounds for termination exists.47
If the petitioner satisfies this burden, the court is required to issue an order
terminating parental rights unless it specifically finds that such action would not
be in the best interests of the child.4 8
Termination of parental rights is the method by which the State frees chil-
dren for adoption without the consent of their parents. 49 Thus, the termination
statute ostensibly furthers the State's policy of providing abused and neglected
children "a permanent plan of care at the earliest possible age." 50 The perma-
nence and stability envisioned by the statute are largely illusory, however, be-
cause relatively few children removed from their parents ever get adopted.51
"[E]xisting evidence suggests that children removed by the state from the home
of their parents are often destined to remain in limbo until adulthood, wards of a
med, 44 Cal. App. 3d 810, 118 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1975); Chandler v. Cochran, 247 Ga. 184, 275 S.E.2d
23, cerL denied, 454 U.S. 872 (1981); In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. 199, 643 P.2d 168
(1982); In re Atkins, 112 Mich. App. 528, 316 N.W.2d 477 (1982); Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 116,
316 S.E.2d at 255-56. Contra Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1974); Helvey v. Rednour, 86
Ill. App. 3d 154, 408 N.E.2d 17 (1980); In re Miller, 105 Misc. 2d 41, 430 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Fam. Ct.
1980); In re Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976).
43. Termination petitions may be filed by either parent against the other, by a child's judicially
appointed guardian, by a county department of social services or licensed child placing agency that
has custody of the child, by anyone with whom the child has resided for the immediately preceding
two years, or by the child's guardian ad litem. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.24 (1981 & Cum.
Supp. 1983).
44. See id. §§ 7A-289.25(6), -. 32 (1981); see also supra note 6 (list of grounds for termination).
45. The hearing is conducted by a judge, sitting without a jury. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-
289.30(a) (1981). Indigent parents have a right to state appointed counsel in termination proceed-
ings. Id. § 7A-289.30(al) (1981). Butsee Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27
(1981) (no absolute right to counsel in termination cases).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.30(e) (1981); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769
(1982) (constitutional requirement of clear and convincing evidence to establish grounds for
termination).
47. Any one of the grounds stated in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32 (1981) is sufficient to sup-
port an order terminating parental rights. See Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110, 316 S.E.2d at 252; In
re Adcock, 69 N.C. App. 222, 227, 316 S.E.2d 347, 349 (1984).
48. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 7A-289.31(a) (1981); see supra text accompanying note 7. The theoreti-
cally bifurcated nature of this proceeding-an adjudicatory hearing followed by a dispositional
phase-was crucial to the supreme court's decision in Montgomery. See infra text accompanying
notes 76-83. Bifurcation in theory, however, may not be bifurcation in fact. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 85-86.
49. See N.C. GEM. STAT. § 7A-289.33 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
50. Id. § 7A-289.22(2) (1981).
51. The North Carolina Division of Social Services found adoptive parents for 732 children in
fiscal year 1983-84. Memorandum, supra note 32. This was a considerable improvement over the
year before, when 460 were placed, id., but still represents only a small fraction of the total number
of children in Department of Social Services custody. The difficulty in placing children whose par-
ents' rights have been terminated can be especially acute: "Almost all these children, by the time
you get around to terminating parental rights, are older or handicapped in some way. So many of
them have special problems that make them hard to place." Telephone interview with Sue Glasby,
Head, Children's Services Branch, N.C. Division of Social Services (Jan. 24, 1985) [hereinafter cited
as Telephone interview with Sue Glasby]; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 765 n. 15
(1982) (termination of parental rights does not ensure adoption).
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largely indifferent state."' 52 Children in foster care tend to bounce from one
placement to another,5 3 a phenomenon known as "foster caredrift. ' '54 Termi-
nation of parental rights, in other words, is no panacea. If the only thing most
neglected children have to look forward to is a bureaucratic journey toward
emancipation, one might reasonably ask how often termination orders actually
are in the children's best interests. 55
The court of appeals may have had the inadequacies of the child welfare
system in mind when it made its unique56 and ultimately short-lived decision in
In re Montgomery.5 7 In addition, the panel was required to consider the due
process rights of the parents,5 8 as well as the state's interest in its role as parens
patriae.5 9 The court began by acknowledging "the due process evolution that
has taken place in the area of parental rights." 6 According to Judge Hill, this
evolution began in 1972, when the United States Supreme Court recognized the
"essential" right to "conceive and raise one's children."' 61 It culminated in the
case of Santosky v. Kramer,62 in which the Court held that the due process
rights of parents required petitioners to prove grounds for termination of paren-
tal rights by clear and convincing evidence. 63 The court of appeals acknowl-
edged that the Santosky holding had been limited to "matters of procedural due
process," 64 but nonetheless focused on the case's supposed "substantive
importance": 65
Santosky did not attempt to state specifically what must be shown and
what quantum of proof must exist to justify a termination of parental
52. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 273 (Summer 1975). As of Dec. 31, 1984, children in the placement
authority of the Division of Social Services had been there an average of 3 years for white children,
4.1 years for black children, and 5 years for Indian children. Telephone interview with Sue Glasby,
supra note 51; see also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 833-38 (1977) (describing the "limbo" of the New York foster care system).
53. Telephone interview with Sue Glasby, supra note 51; see Wald, State Intervention on Behalf
of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 994 (1975).
54. See Garrison, supra note 31, at 426.
55. See In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 413-15, 293 S.E.2d 127, 138-39 (1982) (Carlton, J., dissent-
ing). One might argue that termination of parental rights, which at least opens up the possibility of
adoption, is preferable to leaving children in the limbo of permanent foster care. See, e.g., In re
Biggers, 50 N.C. App. 332, 343, 274 S.E.2d 236, 243 (1981). On the other hand, "[tiermination of
parental rights... should look.., to the likelihood that the child in question will find suitable
adoptive parents. Except in unusual circumstances, there is nothing to be gained by terminating
parental rights where no effective parental substitute can be provided by way of adoption." H.
KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL §20.7 (1977).
56. "The Court of Appeals ruling is believed to be the first to instruct judges specifically to
consider parental love." Charlotte Observer, Jun. 9, 1983, at 1B, col. 2. The holding caused "an
uproar" among North Carolina child welfare officials. Interview with Janet Mason, Institute of
Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Jan. 24, 1985).
57. 62 N.C. App. 343, 303 S.E.2d 324 (1983), rev'd, 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984).
58. See supra note 42.
59. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
60. Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. at 347, 303 S.E.2d at 326.
61. Id. (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
62. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
63. Id. at 769.
64. Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. at 348, 303 S.E.2d at 326.
65. Id. at 348, 303 S.E.2d at 327.
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rights. Nevertheless, the Court appeared to endorse an approach that
would take into account more than physical or economic factors; an
approach that would reflect some consideration by the trial judge of all
the circumstances of the parent-child relationship in each individual
case. The Court noted that termination proceedings "often required
the fact finder to. . . decide issues difficult to prove to a level of abso-
lute certainty, such as lack of parental motive, absence of affection be-
tween parent and child, and failure of parental foresight and
progress." 66
The words "absence of affection" must have hit a responsive chord in the
court's collective mind, because Judge Hill devoted a great deal of his opinion to
that subject. Taking advantage of the vague statutory definition of child ne-
glect, 67 the court held that trial courts must consider noneconomic and
nonphysical indications of parental fitness in termination cases. 68 Before termi-
nating parental rights on the basis of neglect, trial courts were required to sup-
plement the statutorily mandated findings of fact 69 with evidence concerning the
parents' love and affection for their children.70
The supreme court reversed, 71 stating that "the Court of Appeals, in con-
travention of our Legislature's intent, erroneously elevated the burden of proof
required in proceedings terminating parental rights."' 72 Due process, according
66. Id. (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769).
67. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. Although the statutory defintition of neglect
has survived constitutional challenges based on vagueness, see In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 293
S.E.2d 127 (1982); In re Allen, 58 N.C. App. 322, 293 S.E.2d 607 (1982), phrases such as "proper
care, supervision, and discipline" are nonetheless subject to a wide range of interpretations. The
court of appeals has ruled that the terms used in the statutory definition "are given a precise and
understandable meaning by the normative standards imposed upon parents by our society," In re
Biggers, 50 N.C. App. 332, 341, 274 S.E.2d 236, 241 (1981), but this kind of precision is not very
useful in a difficult case such as Montgomery. It has been argued, however, that the statutory defini-
tion of neglect must be rather vague if it is to protect the interests of children in a wide variety of
circumstances. See Biggers, 50 N.C. App. at 342, 274 S.E.2d at 242 ("This context requires flexibil-
ity in the weighing of each case's facts in order to give the child, as well as the parent, the highest
form of due process."), H. KRAUSE, supra note 55, § 20.3, at 236 ("Statutes need to be flexible to
provide the necessary broad discretion to the courts."); Note, Application of the Vagueness Doctrine
to Statutes Terminating Parental Rights, 1980 Dua L.J. 336, 355.
68. See Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. at 349, 303 S.E.2d at 327.
69. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.30(d) (1981).
70. See Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. at 353, 303 S.E.2d at 330.
71. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984).
72. Id. at 106, 316 S.E.2d at 250. The supreme court arguably misinterpreted the court of
appeals' opinion on this point. The lower court, according to Justice Copeland:
held that the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence standard of proof requires the party
seeking termination of parental rights for neglect to prove not only that the physical and
economic needs of the child are not adequately met, but also that the intangible non-eco-
nomic needs of a child are not adequately met.
Id. at 104-05, 316 S.E.2d at 249. This is not quite what the court of appeals held. It merely required
the trial court in termination cases to make specific findings regarding love and affection, and to take
them into consideration. Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. at 353-54, 303 S.E.2d at 329-30. Judge Hill's
opinion clearly indicated that whatever the weight of nonphysical, noneconomic indicia, evidence of
physical and financial neglect could be controlling in a given case. Id. at 353, 303 S.E.2d at 329.
Even though the supreme court seems to have misinterpreted the court of appeals' ruling, the
ultimate holding can be justified as an exercise of judicial restraint. See infra text following note 99.
The lower court's opinion clearly engrafted an extra procedural requirement onto the termination
statute, see Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. at 349, 303 S.E.2d at 327, and therefore increased the burden
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to Justice Copeland, is satisfied when the petitioner has proved grounds for ter-
mination as they are set forth in the termination statute.7 3 Therefore, the court
held that the lower court had erred in requiring separate findings concerning the
fulfillment of a child's intangible, noneconomic needs.74
Where the evidence shows that a parent has failed or is unable to ade-
quately provide for his child's physical and economic needs. . and it
appears that the parent will not or is not able to correct those inade-
quate conditions within a reasonable time, the court may appropriately
conclude that the child is neglected. . . . [T]he fact that the parent
loves or is concerned about his child will not necessarily prevent the
court from making a determination that the child is neglected. 75
The supreme court did not dispute the importance of love and affection in
family relationships. 76 Rather, it held that these intangible factors should be
taken into consideration at the dispositional stage of a termination proceed-
ing-not during the adjudicatory phase.77 The purpose of the adjudicatory hear-
ing78 is to determine whether grounds for termination exist under section 7A-
289.32, which says nothing about love or affection. 79 The dispositional phase,80
on the other hand, is relatively open-ended. Even if grounds for termination
have been established, "the [trial] court's decision to terminate parental rights is
discretionary." ' The trial judge may dismiss a petition for termination if, in his
opinion, termination of parental rights would not be in the best interests of the
child.8 2 Thus, intangibles such as love and affection not only are relevant at the
dispositional phase-they may be controlling.8 3
The Montgomery holding, while seemingly straightforward, raises at least
three important questions. First, what exactly did the supreme court mean by
its bifurcated approach to termination hearings? The court of appeals seems to
have envisioned a unitary proceeding in which the adjudicatory and disposi-
tional phases are merged for all practical purposes.8 4 North Carolina's termina-
tion statute does not explicitly require separate hearings, 8 5 and common practice
on petitioners beyond what was intended by the legislature. Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 106, 316
S.E.2d at 250. Moreover, the supreme court made room for consideration of the intangibles during
the dispositional phase of termination proceedings. See infra text accompanying notes 76-83.
73. See Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 108-09, 316 S.E.2d at 251; see also supra note 6 (text of
statute setting forth neglect grounds for termination).
74. See Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 108, 316 S.E.2d at 251.
75. Id. at 109, 316 S.E.2d at 252. The supreme court, again overruling the court of appeals,
determined that there was substantial evidence supporting a determination of neglect on the part of
Maxwell and Montgomery. See id. at I 11, 316 S.E.2d at 253. Therefore the judgment of the trial
court was reinstated.
76. Id. at 107, 316 S.E.2d at 250.
77. See id. at 107-08, 316 S.E.2d at 251; see also supra text accompanying notes 43-48 (synopsis
of termination procedure).
78. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.30 (1981).
79. See supra note 6.
80. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.31 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
81. Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110, 316 S.E.2d at 252.
82. Id. at 107, 316 S.E.2d at 251.
83. See id.
84. See Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. at 353-54, 303 S.E.2d at 329-30.
85. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-289.30 to .31 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
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seems to favor a unitary approach.8 6 The supreme court's opinion in Montgom-
ery makes little sense, however, unless there is some clear distinction between
the adjudicatory and dispositional stages of a termination proceeding.87
Second, what is the proper burden of proof in the dispositional phase, and
who should bear it? Although the petitioner must prove grounds for termina-
tion by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence,"'8 8 the statute is silent as to the
evidentiary standard governing disposition; nothing is said about which party
must prove what is in the child's best interests, or what the quantum of that
proof must be.89 Some have suggested that once grounds for termination have
been established, the parents should bear the burden of proving that termination
would not benefit the child. 90 The supreme court in Montgomery simply stated
that disposition is "discretionary," 91 and strongly implied that the trial judge at
this point is on his own.92 Given that termination of parental rights often results
in no demonstrable benefit to the children involved,93 the best practice in these
cases would be to make petitioners prove by at least a preponderance of the
evidence that termination would be in the best interests of the children.94
Third, what besides love and affection should trial courts consider at the
86. Appellate records filed in Montgomery and other termination cases indicate that evidence
typically is taken at a single hearing, after which the judge issues an order that combines his findings
concerning grounds for termination and his disposition of the case. See Records on Appeal for In re
Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984), In re Allen, 58 N.C. App. 322, 293 S.E.2d 607
(1982), and In re Biggers, 50 N.C. App. 332, 274 S.E.2d 236 (1981).
87. Some states permit, but do not require, separate adjudicatory and dispositional hearings in
termination cases. See, eg., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-607 (1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.424
(West Supp. 1984). Separate hearings often are required, however, in an initial neglect proceeding,
when the petitioner seeks removal of a child from its parents' custody. See IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 232.96, -.99 (West 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-404 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-639 to
-640 (1981); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.34.110 (Supp. 1985); Singleman, A Case of Neglect:
Parens Patriae Versus Due Process in Child Neglect Proceedings, 17 ARIz. L. REv. 1055, 1077
(1975); see also supra text accompanying notes 35-40 (describing typical pretermination actions
taken by state in cases of neglect).
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.30(e) (1981); Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110, 316 S.E.2d at 252.
89. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.31 (1981 & Supp. 1983). The statute, however, does state
that when grounds for termination have been proved, "the court shall issue an order terminating
. . . parental rights. . . unless the court shall further determine that the best interests of the child
require that. . . parental rights.., not be terminated." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, it can be
argued that the burden of proving that termination would not benefit the child is on the parents at
this point. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. But cf. infra text accompanying notes 91-92
(supreme court does not seem to accept this view).
90. This position was argued by the Montgomery appellants and their allies before the supreme
court. They contended that "at the dispositional stage of a termination case there is a presumption
or inference in favor of termination; and. . . the parent should bear the burden of establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the best interests of the child require that rights not be termi-
nated." Brief for Amicus Curiae Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services at 5; see also
Brief for Appellants at 14-15 (making similar assertions).
91. Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110, 316 S.E.2d at 252.
92. See id.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
94. In some states the court is required to find by clear and convincing evidence that termina-
tion would be in the child's best interests. See, eg., ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 22, § 4055(l)(B)(2)(a)
(Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-147(d) (1984). In addition to protecting children from
unwarranted state action, such a rule acknowledges the "fundamental liberty interest of natural
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child." Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753; see supra
note 42.
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dispositional stage of a termination hearing? Both the statute and the Montgom-
ery opinion state that termination decisions are controlled by the best interests of
the child.95 Neither authority, however, spells out how those interests are de-
fined. 96 A comprehensive list of relevant factors probably would be endless, but
the trial court should be required to enter at least some findings of fact in sup-
port of its disposition.97 For example, a child's adoptability surely is relevant to
whether termination of parental rights would be in his best interests;98 if a child
cannot be placed, termination of parental rights can do him little good.9 9
The North Carolina legislature's definition of child neglect may be vague,
but that does not justify the court of appeals' attempt to increase the statutory
burden on petitioners in termination cases. Thus, the supreme court's reversal
in Montgomery was an appropriate exercise of judicial restraint. The court
should be commended, moreover, for recognizing the importance of love and
affection in termination cases and for putting such considerations in their proper
place. Nevertheless, questions and concerns about North Carolina's termination
procedures persist in the wake of Montgomery. The supreme court should clar-
ify the extent to which termination hearings must be bifurcated, so that proper
consideration can be given to the different issues at stake in the adjudicatory and
dispositional phases. The burden of proving that termination is in the best inter-
ests of the child should be placed squarely on the petitioner in order to protect
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.22(3) (1981 & Supp. 1983); Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 116, 316
S.E.2d at 256.
96. Wisconsin courts, by way of contrast, have been given explicit guidance by the legislature:
In considering the best interests of the child ... the court shall consider but not be limited
to the following:
(a) The likelihood of the child's adoption after termination.
(b) The age and health of the child, both at the time of the disposition and, if applica-
ble, at the time the child was removed from the home.
(c) Whether the child has substantial relationships with the parent or other family
members, and whether it would be harmful to the child to sever these relationships.
(d) The wishes of the child.
(e) The duration of the separation of the parent from the child.
(f) Whether the child will be able to enter into a more stable and permanent family
relationship as a result of the termination, taking into account the conditions of the child's
current placement, the likelihood of future placements and the results of prior placements.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.426(3) (West Supp.1984).
97. Termination orders typically make a conclusory statement to the effect that termination of
parental rights is in the child's best interests. Findings of fact supporting grounds for termination
are included in the order, but there generally are no separate findings demonstrating why termina-
tion is in the best interests of the child. See Records on Appeal for In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101,
316 S.E.2d 246 (1984), In re Allen, 58 N.C. App. 322, 293 S.E.2d 607 (1982), and In re Biggers, 50
N.C. App. 332, 274 S.E.2d 236 (1981). Much of the evidence will support both conclusions, of
course, but there also may be situations in which the proof establishing grounds for termination is
not sufficient to prove that termination is in the best interests of the child. See Montgomery, 311 N.C.
at 107, 316 S.E.2d at 251.
98. See supra note 96.
99. See V. DEFRANcIS, TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 15 (1971); supra note 55. The
court of appeals has ruled that trial judges need not find that a child is highly adoptable before
terminating parental rights, In re Norris, 65 N.C. App. 269, 310 S.E.2d 25 (1983), cert. denied, 310
N.C. 744, 315 S.E.2d 703 (1984), but some district court judges reportedly consider adoptability to
be a key factor in their termination decisions: "Some judges think there should be a home waiting
before parental rights are terminated. Some [child care] professionals feel that way too." Telephone
interview with Sue Glasby, supra note 51.
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the due process rights of both children and their parents. The factors to be
considered in determining a child's best interests should be elucidated. Courts
may be justified in deferring to the legislature on some of these matters, but
judicial restraint should not be an excuse for inaction when such vital relation-
ships hang in the balance.
GARY R. GOVERT
